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Wage Inequality by Education and Gender in MENA:  
Contrasting the Egyptian and Moroccan Experiences in the 1990s 
 
Abstract 
 
The 1990s has been a decade of  considerable socioeconomic change in the MENA 
region characterized by adoption of economic liberalization policies and a declining role 
of the state as an employer in the labor market. This paper explores some of the equity 
implications of this transition by examining changes in the distribution of returns to 
education and gender wage premia in the Egypt and Morocco market using joint models 
of educational choice and wage determination. Selectivity corrected returns to different 
levels of education indicate that a reduction in the role of the public sector lead to lower 
returns in the private sector and falling returns over time. Only at the university level,  are 
returns higher in the private sector in Egypt indicating that employers place relatively 
little value on basic and secondary education. In Morocco there is some evidence of 
higher returns in the private sector by the end of the 1990, which might be indicative of 
better matching of educational credentials and productivity differences. Oaxaca-Blinder 
wages-differentials decompositions of sector and gender wage gap for Egypt and 
Morocco indicate that the unexplained component in public wage premia and gender gaps 
have declined in Egypt, but substantially increased in Morocco over the 1990s. Overall, 
economic liberalization and public sector retrenchment which were much more 
comprehensive in Morocco appear to have had a more dislocating effect also on labor 
market wage outcomes. The paper ends with some policy implications and suggests 
future directions of research in the areas of educational and public sector reform and 
policies to improve access of women to the private sectors in MENA.
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I.  Introduction: 
It is now fairly well-established that labor markets around the world tend to be structured 
along gender and level of educational attainment dimensions. In accordance, the last two 
decades or so has seen a proliferation of research on returns to education and gender-
based discrimination in both developed and developing world contexts. Given the 
traditionally large role of the state as an employer throughout the MENA region, the 
gender-education nexus in wage setting has often been explored across the public-private 
divide for those countries.   
There is some preliminary published evidence indicating that for a selected group 
of MENA countries (Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen) returns to education are 
generally higher in the public sector than in the private sector at nearly all education 
levels but the university level. This suggests that the private sector places less value on 
basic and secondary education (World Bank, 2004). There also appears to be a gender 
dimension to the distribution of returns to Education. For example, analysis of 1988 and 
1998 Egyptian data has shown that over that decade, returns to education have been 
falling for nearly all educational levels, but the decline was most dramatic for females 
(Said, 2002). These results call attention for the need for further examination of gender 
differentials in returns to education in Egypt and else-where in the MENA region. 
This paper examines changes in the distribution of returns to education and 
gender wage premia in the Egyptian and Moroccan labor market in the 1990s. This 
period have been one of considerable socioeconomic change in both countries, 
characterized by adoption of economic liberalization policies and a declining role of the 
state as an employer in the labor market.  The choice to focus our research on a 
comparison between Egypt and Morocco in the 1990s, emanated from both empirical 
(availability of data) and theoretical grounds. Not only are there relatively rich data sets 
for those two countries, but also the comparison between them can be quite informative 
for conceptual reasons. Both countries had some form of guarantee of public sector 
employment for their graduates,
1
 but stand at two extremes in terms of problems in their 
educational systems. Egypt is praised for now approaching universal primary school 
enrollment and closing the gender gap on that count, but criticized for over-investing in 
low quality secondary and tertiary education, whereas Morocco is seen to be one of only 
three countries in the region (the other two being Saudi Arabia and Yemen) where access 
to primary schools remains problematic; especially for girls (Van Eeghen, 2003; 
Megahid, 2004). It would be interesting to examine how these differing patterns impacted 
on gender wage differentials and labor market rewards to education.   
For both countries, we formally test the hypothesis that a reduction in the role of 
the public sector led to falling returns to education over time and lower returns in the 
private sector compared to the public sector. This will be accomplished by estimating 
selectivity corrected returns to different levels of education, from which a crude estimate 
of the private rate of return is calculated. However, a reduction in educational premia 
does not necessarily mean that wage inequality is reduced. Wage inequality along other 
dimensions, such as gender, occupation and region, may in fact increase as public sector 
wage-setting rules become less salient (World Bank, 2004). Thus a second set of 
questions that will be examined in this paper relates to whether there has been a widening 
                                                 
1
 Although in Morocco the scheme was not as formalized and comprehensive as in Egypt, nor indeed did it 
have the same devastating impact on educational expansion and labor market outcomes. 
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in wage differentials, particularly along gender and sector lines since the early 1990s in 
both countries. 
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows: Section II presents a brief 
review of recent research on returns to education and relates it to past results published 
for the MENA region. Section III then introduces the methodology of estimation used in 
this paper and Section IV presents the main results from applying these models to four 
round of household-level labor survey data for Egypt and Morocco in the 1990s. Section 
V decomposes gender-based wage inequality for the two countries to facilitate studying 
hypotheses on the incidence of gender discrimination, and Section VI concludes by 
drawing some policy implications and pointing to some future directions of research.  
 
II.  Approaches in Returns to Education Research: A Literature Review 
There are several approaches in researching education and labor market outcomes. A 
number of studies use Mincer‟s human capital earnings function (HCEF). This model is 
also the most commonly employed method in labor economics. In the human capital 
model, an individual invests time and forgone earnings in order to obtain higher future 
benefits, the discounting method is then used to calculate individual (private) rate of 
return.
2
 The methodology used in the human capital literature has been criticized for not 
taking into consideration other important factors such as family background that are not 
typically available in wage data.  
A related model used to calculate educational attainment is the reduced–form 
estimation model. Studies implementing reduced-form models typically evaluate the 
influence of family and neighborhood characteristics on returns to education. Numerous 
studies find strong evidence that parental education has a significant effect on the child‟s 
returns to education (Haveman et al, 1991; Wilson, 2001). 
The literature on the production function approach in researching education views 
various school characteristics, specifically teacher salaries, class size, student/teacher 
ratio, and expenditures per student, as inputs, and the educational attainments of 
individuals, specifically test scores, years of education, and graduation rates, as outputs. 
Such an approach concentrates on the educational process itself and the educational 
attainment of an individual, (Wilson, 2001; Hanushek 1986; Kremer 1995). The major 
difference between human capital model and production function approach is that the 
latter does not consider the individual as a decision maker choosing level of schooling. 
Instead, it evaluates different factors that affect the individual‟s educational attainment. 
Many studies include family background into the models estimating returns to 
education. A number of research studies demonstrate that children who grow up in a low-
income family typically have lower educational achievements and, subsequently, lower 
returns to education than children who grow up in a wealthy family (Haveman et al., 
1991). They also find that the mother‟s education usually has a positive effect on 
educational returns of a child. Moreover, a vast research on returns to education suggests 
that additional years of schooling increase the return to education.
3
  
                                                 
2
 The HCEF is a simple regression model with a linear schooling term and a low-order polynomial in 
potential experience (Card, 1998). 
3
 According to Altonji (1998), the wage level rises by 8 percent in response to each additional year of 
academic postsecondary education. In their study on estimating returns to education for a sample of twins, 
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) find each year of schooling increases wage rate by 12 –16 percent. Even 
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Cosca (2000) confirms the finding of many economists that, in general, 
employees with a bachelor‟s, master‟s, doctoral, or professional degree have higher 
average incomes and lower unemployment rates than do employees with less education. 
Jaeger and Page (1996) estimate the returns to schooling and the “sheepskin” effect. The 
sheepskin effect reflects the difference in earnings due to the possession of a degree. The 
reason is simply that a diploma serves as a signal of productivity in the labor market, thus 
increasing the individual‟s potential earnings. Jaeger and Page demonstrate strong 
evidence that diploma effects exist for all post-secondary degrees.
4
  
Microeconometric studies on returns to education and gender wage differentials  
are few in MENA, due to the scarcity of data, and most highlighted differences between 
public and private sectors. The availability of rich datasets in the late 1990s facilitated 
some preliminary analyses for Turkey ( see Tansel, 1994, 1999a and 1999b) and Egypt 
(see Assaad , 1997, Said 2002,  2003 and 2004 and El-Hamidi , 2004).  
The World Bank Regional Report (2004) presents some  recent estimates for 
returns to education in Egypt,  Morocco, Jordan and Yemen  which showed that returns 
to schooling are generally higher in the public sector than in the private sector at nearly 
all education levels, with the exception of university education.
5
  Rates of return to 
schooling appear to be higher for women than for men in the private sector, which 
implies that the gender gap in wages declines with education. The results also indicate 
that rates of return to education in the private sector are fairly stable over time in Egypt 
but declined in Morocco, whereas in the public sector, rates of return appear to be 
declining in both Egypt and Morocco.   
 The estimates above however are hampered by the fact that the methodologies 
of estimation are not comparable across countries.
6
 Self-selection bias is also not  
corrected for in calculating gender wage gaps. In this paper we conduct a more detailed 
study of educational choice and earning determination in Egypt and Morocco, based on 
the same estimation techniques that correct for selectivity bias,  in order to arrive at 
strictly comparable estimates of returns to education, wage inequality and gender 
differentials for the two countries. The estimation model used is described in the 
following section. 
 
III.  Estimation Methodology: 
Research on returns to education is based on the work by Mincer (1974). In the 
traditional specification, returns to education are estimated as follows: 
 
LnW = 0 + 1EDU + 2EXP + 3EXP2 + u     (1) 
 
Where EDU is the number of years of schooling, EXP is experience in years, EXP
2 
is 
experience squared, and u is a random disturbance term. The specification is shown 
                                                                                                                                                 
when they adjust for a measurement error, their estimates are not less than 9 percent per year of school 
completed (Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994). 
4 An important test to this finding is to estimate the same model using years of schooling rather than 
educational dummies to find out if the labor market values degrees more than the equivalent years of 
schooling. 
5
 Only in Yemen, a country with very low educational achievement and very low returns in general, are the 
returns comparable or slightly higher in the private sector. 
6
 For example, regressions for Morocco do not correct for sample election bias, whereas for Egypt they do.  
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logarithmically in order for the regressors to be interpreted in terms of marginal effects. 
In this way index β is interpreted as the rate of returns to schooling. This function that has 
been introduced by Mincer (1974) is known as the human capital earnings function. It 
has been the basis of practically all research on returns to education. 
Griliches (1977), however, pointed out that the coefficient estimates of the OLS 
estimation of the classical model could suffer from what is now known as „self-selection 
bias‟. When individual‟s family background and ability influence his/her educational 
attainment, the individual is said to be self-selected into that educational attainment. If 
educational attainment of an individual is partially determined by his/her abilities and 
family backgrounds, estimating the previous classical earnings function without taking 
into account the possibility that family background and ability might influence 
educational attainment, could give biased results.  
One approach to reduce the bias is to include control variables that might capture 
part of the unobserved components in the error term. These controls should also enter in 
form of interaction terms with education to allow for heterogeneous slope coefficients. 
The higher the correlation between the added variables and the unobserved components, 
the lower endogeneity bias. Control variables such as family background characteristics: 
Father and mother level of education and father‟s occupation. An interaction term 
between education and family background can capture the effect of family background on 
returns to education.  
These results, however, are still subject to another type of selection bias. 
Basically, the equation has been estimated from data on workers, resulting in a censored 
sample of the entire population. When estimating the wage equation, only those who 
reported wages at the time of the survey are entered into the analysis, while the ones who 
were not working did not report any wage. In order to solve the problem of sample 
selection bias, Heckman (1979) suggests estimating two equations. First the participation 
equation is estimated, consisting in estimating through a logit, for the purpose of this 
study, the probability of having worked at the time of the survey, and out of school (using 
the entire sample: workers and non-workers). From the logit results, a selection variable 
(the inverse Mills ratio term) is created. This estimate is used in the second step, as an 
additional regressor in the wage equation, yielding consistent estimates of the coefficients 
free of censoring bias. 
A recent extension to this model is to capture the so-called “certification effect” 
or “sheep skin effect”. The idea is an employer might value a worker with a certificate 
more than a worker without one. For this reason, and to allow for estimated rate of return 
to vary by level of schooling, dummies for levels of education are used instead of years 
of schooling.  
 
The modified Mincerian earnings function is: 
 
LnW = 0 + ∑kE.Dumik + 2EXP + 3EXP
2
 + u     (2) 
 
Where E.Dum consists of dummies for levels of education. Years of experience are 
calculated by the following formula: 
 
(age - year of survey): i.e. year at which individual entered the labor force.  
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In this specification, the private rate of return to the k
th 
level of education is estimated by 
the following formula: 
 
rk = (k - k-1)/ nk         (3) 
 
where k is the coefficient of a specific level of education, k-1 is the coefficient of the 
previous level of education, and n is the difference in years of schooling between K and 
K-1. (Psacharopoulos, 1981). 
This procedure involves three assumptions: 
1. Direct costs are either minor, or are compensated by a student‟s part-time and/or 
summer earnings. This assumption is satisfied in the current analysis since 
education is either free or involves minimal fees. 
2. The opportunity cost of foregone earnings is equal to the earnings of the next 
lower level predicted by the model. 
3. The earnings profiles are isomorphic, that is, they are of the form ycf(x), where yc 
are the initial earnings of the educational category in question and f(x) is a 
multiplicative experience function common to all educational levels.‟ 
It is expected to see the rate of returns to educational levels fall as the educational level 
gets higher, since the opportunity cost of education increases with educational level. 
 
1- First Stage: Ordered Logit Model 
In this study, we study educational choice using the ordered logit model where education 
variable is ordered from zero to five, where 0= illiterate; 1= read and write; 2= primary; 
3= preparatory; and 4=secondary and 5= university and above. The model is: 
 
iii xy  
'*          (4) 
Where *iy  is a latent variable that is a function of a vector of explanatory variables. 
The standard logistic distribution has a mean of 0 and its density function is:  
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These   must satisfy the rule:  0<  1……<  5. Since the disturbance terms are 
logistically distributed, we obtain the following probabilities:  
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The estimation of the unknown coefficients β and thresholds   can be estimated using 
maximum likelihood method, where the above probabilities are the elements of the 
likelihood function. 
 
Explanatory variables that enter into the ordered logit model include: educational 
dummies for the father and the mother as proxies for household socioeconomic status. It 
is assumed that higher parental educational attainment to imply higher socioeconomic 
status.  Since the mother is often the provider of the learning environment for her 
children, mother‟s education (rather than father‟s) might have more significant impact on 
the individual‟s education decision, as discussed in Behrman and Wolfe (1984), Chiswick 
(1986) and Heckman and Hotz (1986).  Regional differences in choosing a certain level 
of education is captured by regional dummy. Other explanatory variables include number 
of siblings in the household. It is expected to find lower educated parents, and the 
presence of young siblings in the household to be associated with choosing a lower level 
of education, since the graduate assumes an employment right after getting the certificate. 
 
2- Second Stage: Earnings Function 
Estimating the parameters in the first stage allows calculating the selection term, to 
correct for selectivity bias, which is then entered linearly into the wage equation. 
The dependent variable in the wage equation is the log hourly earnings. Log hourly 
earnings is used (instead of hourly earning) because it reduces the effects of earnings 
outliers. The model therefore is: 
 
LnW = 0 + ∑kE.Dumik + 2EXP + 3EXP
2
 + ∑j Reg. Dumij+ 4 +u (8) 
 
Where E.Dum are dummies for levels of education, experience, experience squared, 
regional dummy and the selection term. 
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Experience variables are included in the model since workers with more years of job 
experience are likely to earn more. (Higher experience is often associated with higher 
skills and higher productivity.) A firm is likely to use higher wages to induce experienced 
workers to stay on in their jobs, as the cost of training new workers could be very 
expensive. The experience squared variable is included to capture the possibility of a 
non-linear relationship between experience and earnings. We expect a positive sign of the 
experience variable for the reason that working experience is likely to contribute to 
enhancement of individual‟s human capital, and negative coefficient of experience square 
as marginal returns from experience tend to decline over the lifetime.  
Interaction of the effects of schooling and experience on earnings should not be 
neglected. A common reason is the fact that the first few years in the labor market are 
time for experimenting and frequent job change. As a consequence, earnings of many 
individuals rise in their first years in the labor force, then level off and increases by a 
decreasing rate. Another rationale is that the life-time patterns of low level of education 
and highly educated workers‟ earnings differ by nature: for example, the marginal effects 
of experience on education for a worker with a lower level of education are likely to 
increase during the first years of work and diminish afterwards.  A university educated 
worker, on the contrary, faces increasing marginal returns to experience. Omission of the 
interaction variable, therefore, leads to the omitted variable bias in the coefficients 
estimates. 
The coefficients of educational variables are expected to be positive, and their 
magnitudes increase through post general school levels as follows (in ascending order): 
read and write, primary, preparatory, secondary, and university and above. That is we 
assume private earnings increase the higher the level of education.  
 
IV  Data and Empirical Results 
The empirical analysis is based on the 1988 and 1998 Egypt Labor Force Sample Surveys 
(LFSS), which are both nationally representative household surveys covering 10,000 
households in1988 and 5000 households in 1998;  as well as The Morocco Living 
Standard Measurement Studies (MLSMS) of 1990/1991 and 1998/1999, covering 3349 
households in 1990/91, and 5129 households in 1998/1999. Both surveys include 
extensive data on employment characteristics such as status, economic activity, duration 
of unemployment, occupation …etc.  
Variables used in this study include: employment status, level of education 
(illiterate, read and write, primary, preparatory, secondary and university and above), age, 
experience, experience squared, regional dummies (rural vs. urban), parental education
7
, 
hourly wages (in logs), and number of children in the household (one dummy for those 
less than 6 years of age; and a dummy for those greater than six years of age). 
The analysis is restricted to non-agriculture workers,
8
 who are sons or daughters 
of the household heads between the ages of 15 and 64, and not currently enrolled in 
school. Table (A-1) in the appendix displays means and standard deviations for variables.   
                                                 
7
 There were cases with few observations on Mother‟s level of education, therefore, and for the purpose of 
this comparative study, we opted to use one dummy that takes the value zero for illiterate mothers and 1 for 
literate mothers. 
8
 High rates of seasonal employment within the agriculture sector are justification for excluding them from 
the analysis. 
 10 
 
IV.1. Ordered Logit Estimates:  
Tables 1 through 16 show the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the 
probability of choosing certain levels of education derived from an ordered logit model, 
for men and women, 1988 and 1998 for Egypt, and 1991 and 1991 for Morocco. Since all 
explanatory variables are dummies, the marginal effects show the effect of a discrete 
change from zero to one. The reference individual lives in a rural region, with illiterate 
parents, and no siblings.  
The results for Egyptian males and females, 1988-1998 are shown in Tables 1 
through 8. They reveal that region has little impact on choice of level of education for 
males and females. Only for private sector males (and public sector males only in 1998), 
do we find significant coefficients indicating positive signals towards pursuing education 
over residing in rural areas. Similarly, the presence of siblings less than six years of age 
had no effect except for a negative impact on private sector males in 1988 and 1998, 
beyond primary education. It is the parent‟s education variables that appear to have the 
expected strong effect. Having a literate mother does increase the probability of a public 
sector worker to have had university education. Fathers level of education is also 
significant in both years and for both sectors. The higher the father‟s education the higher 
the chances the individual chooses university level of education in both sectors. For 
private sector females, having a father with secondary education seems to have the 
highest effect on his daughter to have a university education. However, the magnitude of 
the effect of parent‟s level of education on their sons/daughters education has decreased 
between 1988 and 1998, for public sector men and women and for private sector women. 
Results for Moroccan males and females, 1991-1999, are shown in Tables 9 -16.
9
  
Similar to Egypt, residing in urban regions had significant effects only in 1999, which 
was stronger in the public sector for both sexes. This is indicative that education is 
significantly more accessible, encouraged and nurtured in urban areas, and responds to 
public sector demands, as opposed to rural areas. Also the presence of siblings in the 
household has no effect on women‟s schooling decision and a significant but small 
negative effect on men‟s decisions. Compared to Egypt however, the impact of 
parents‟education, especially father‟s,  appears to be much more muted. Mother‟s 
education affects private sector (but not public sector) education for both men and 
women.  Fathers education does not affect the decision for schooling except for public 
sector workers, in 1991, when fathers have a secondary education, it positively increases 
the chances of the son seeking an education, whereas  a father with a primary certificate 
reduces the chances for his daughter to pursue education beyond intermediate levels. In 
1999, father‟s education effect seems sparse and weak, although significant. 
 
IV.2. Earnings Function Estimates: 
Tables 17-20  display selectivity corrected estimates of the returns equation, with 
interaction terms, for Egyptian men and women. The selection term is significant in both 
years for Egyptian males, suggesting that unobservable heterogeneity is playing a 
significant factor in the determination of wages. Selection term is, however insignificant 
                                                 
9
 For comparison purposes, we opted to use the same variables in both surveys; however, some of the 
variables in one survey were not available in the other. This problem appeared explicitly in Morocco data, 
1991 were we had small number of observations in some cases.  
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for women, indicating that sample selection is not a problem. Public sector wage workers 
in urban regions earn substantially higher wages than public sector workers in rural areas. 
Region of residence did not have any effect on private sector workers. Experience has the 
expected profile and the coefficients of education dummies all have the expected positive 
sign, and the majority are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level or more. 
These results may suggest that employers are affected by credentialism in their wage-
setting. The education coefficients in this case, may be regarded as evidence of 
credentialism, or screening for ability. The table shows the higher the level of education, 
the higher the wages of public sector male workers, though their real wages dropped in 
1998. Private sector male workers earned less than public workers especially at the 
secondary level and beyond. The same pattern of rising wages with higher levels of 
education is also noticed for private sector workers. Women in public sector appear to 
have gained in real terms than men. The higher the level of education, the higher their 
real wages, signifying education does pay off for women. An important finding is that 
women seem to have greater variations in their real wages according to their level of 
education, as compared to men. For example, women with a secondary education in 1998 
earned a little over twice of what an illiterate woman would earn, as compared with a 
difference of 80% for men. 
Tables 21-24  report the selectivity corrected wage equation estimates for 
Morocco. Self- selection bias does not appear to be an issue for female wage equations or 
1991 male equations, as indicated by insignificant selection terms. For Moroccan private 
sector males, residing in an urban area increases their wages in both years. The effect is 
also significant but only in 1999 for public sector male and private sector female workers. 
Wages increased by increasing the level of education and, for certain categories of 
workers, there is evidence of some wage compression as indicated by a decline in returns 
to education between 1991 and 1999. In particular, primary educated male workers used 
to earn over 80% higher wages than illiterates in 1991, whereas in 1999 they earned only 
and extra, and secondary educated women workers in the public sector earned triple that 
of illiterate women in 1991, whereas in 1999 they only earned double that level.  
 
IV.3. Private Rates of Return to Education: 
The private rates of return to education from the above wage equation estimates are 
calculated and listed  in Tables 25 and 26 for Egypt and Morocco respectively. These 
calculations assume that the illiterate have zero years of education, those who can read 
and write have 3 years of education, primary education encompasses 6 years of 
education, preparatory education achieves 9 years of education, secondary certificates 
requires 12 years of education, and university education graduate achieves 16 years of 
education. 
 Table (25) shows that in Egypt, 1988-1998 was indeed a decade of wage 
compression.
10
 With the exception of private sector females (whose coefficients were 
insignificant any way),  almost all private rates of returns to education for males working 
in either the public or private sectors have dropped between 1988 and 1998.  Thus, a 
public sector male with a university degree earned 7% more than a public sector worker 
with a secondary certificate in 1988, but only 5.5% more in 1998 (a difference of 1.5%). 
                                                 
10
 This finding are consistent with the main conclusion reported in previous research (Said, 1992) using the 
same data , but not correcting for self-selection bias. 
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Private sector workers with comparable degrees noticed a drop of 4% in their earnings. 
Females were not in a better position either. Again, returns to university education 
compared to secondary certificates dropped for public sector females by 1.4 percentage 
points.  
Table 26 also shows that a similar trend has been taking place in Morocco in the 
1990s. For Moroccan males with university education (vs. secondary) in public sector, 
private returns dropped sharply in 10 years, from 26% to less than 5% in 1999. Private 
sector males also witnessed a drop in their returns at all levels of education between 1991 
and 1999. Although we notice the same result for females, their coefficients were 
insignificant from the start. Females in public sector with university degrees had a drop in 
their returns by only 1 percentage point. But overall, females in the public sector did fare 
better in 1999. 
 
 V. Decomposing Gender and Public-Private Wage Inequality: 
Besides estimating such “sheep skin effects” using both Moroccan and Egyptian data, we 
formally study various hypotheses relating to the incidence of gender pay discrimination, We 
further decompose the gender gap into components attributable to pure pay discrimination 
within sectors as opposed to differences in characteristics.   
In order to ascertain whether changes in returns to education translated into altering overall 
wage inequality in the Egyptian and Moroccan labor markets, we study wage differentials 
along two lines: public-private, and male- female.  
The overall sample selection adjusted wage differential between public and 
private (or males and females) workers can be decomposed into different components: (1) 
a portion due to differences in average characteristics, such as experience, region and 
education. (2) a portion due to differences in the parameters of the wage function, caused 
by labor market discrimination and other omitted factors, and (3) a portion due to 
differences in selectivity bias. 
Adopting the methodology, which was first utilized by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder 
(1973), the differences in the logarithmic wages between public and private, or male and 
female wages is written as: 
fm Wln  Wln  Wln         (9) 
where the operator   represents the mean difference between male and female wages. 
First, separate wage equations are estimated for male and female workers. The estimated 
wage equations are then used to decompose the observed wage differential between male 
and female workers into components due to personal characteristics, to parameters and to 
sample selectivity bias. 
If the average observed log wage for type j worker is ji ijij /nlnW  Wln  . The average 
observed characteristics, ji ij nX   X /  and the average sample selectivity bias term, 


i jij nX  /  where nj is the number of individuals in a j group. In this case, j=male (m), 
female (f). Suppose that m

 is the competitive wage and that females are compensated at 
the same wage as male workers. Then, the predicted mean wage for females using 
competitive wages is given by m

Xf. In other terms, the previous equation can be written, 
including the selection term, as:  
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       m              (  )m f m m m f m f f f m f flnW - lnW X X X X                
     
 
   
  
 
  f f  (  X )  (   )   (   )m m m f m m f fX  X            
    
(10) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation () is the differences in the endowments 
of wage-determining characteristics (X’s) between the male and female workers, 
evaluated according to the male pay structure ( m

). This portion can also be interpreted 
as the wage gain females would experience if they had the same characteristics on the 
average as males. The second term on the right-hand side is the portion due to differences 
in pay structure (coefficients, s'

) between males and females. It is the wage gain 
females would experience, given their mean characteristics, if they were compensated as 
males. The last term represents the wage differential attributed to sample selection bias.  
Accordingly, we run into an index number problem (Oaxaca, 1973; Jones, 1983). The 
problem arises when heterogeneous group of characteristics (X variables) are summed 
with two sets of wages (males and females). Following the approach employed by 
Reimers (1983), which uses an unweighted average of each type of worker‟s coefficients, 
the wage differential can be decomposed as:  
  Wln Wln   fm  )()((5.0)((5.0 ffmmfm f m ffm f m         )X  X   X   )X  X 


  
(11) 
In this section, we look at the effect of macro policies on wage inequality. We follow the 
literature by applying Oaxaca-Blinder wages differentials model and using the same 
methodology to sort out the differences in wages between public and private (and male-
female) sectors that are due to endowments and those that are due to discrimination, i.e. 
the explained from the unexplained. We grouped differences due to discrimination and 
differences due to selection bias in one “unexplained” factor.  
Table (27) presents decompositions for gender and sector wage gaps for Egypt 
and Morocco which separate the justifiable or fair (i.e. explained) and unjustifiable or 
unfair (i.e. unexplained or discrimination) components.  For Egypt, the male public sector 
wage premium declined from 7% in 1991 to 3% 1998; whereas the female one remind 
almost the same at 16-17 %. In other words, by the end of the decade under study, the 
public sector remained just as attractive for females, but lost a bit of its attraction, at least 
in terms of wage premiums for men. In term of the adjusted gender wage gaps, they 
appear to have declined in both the public sector (from 8 to 3%) and private sector (from 
40% to 12%). Overall, wage inequality by education and gender appears to have declined 
substantially in Egypt during that decade of pursuing economic liberalization policies.
11
  
By contrast, all changes in public sector premiums and unexplained  wage gaps in 
Morocco appear to be in the opposite direction. Male premiums in the public sector 
                                                 
11
 When comparing the gender gap along public and private lines, we reached a different picture than the 
previous research (World Bank, 2004). That is, the adjusted private sector gender wage differences have 
also dropped in 1998. One immediate explanation, would be correcting for selectivity which was not 
preformed in the previous research. Other interpretations/ securitization are in process. 
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increased from 33% in 1991 to 58% and so did female premiums, which dramatically 
jumped from 14% in 1991 to 81% in 1999. The first explanation that comes to mind for 
the latter result is that the private sector in Morocco became much more discriminating in  
wage payments to women. This suspicion is confirmed by the results on gender wage 
differentials, also presented in the same table that show that the unexplained component 
attributable to gender-based discrimination has doubled between 1991 and 1999, reaching  
a still modest 6 % in the public sector and 42% in the private sector – which is high by 
international standards. Overall, and in contrast to what happened in Egypt, the nineties 
appears to be a decade of increasing wage inequality by gender and education in 
Morocco.  
 
VI. Concluding remarks and future Directions of Research 
Since the early 1990s, most countries in the MENA region, and with differing degrees,   
started embarking on a new development model that aspires to rely mostly on an ever 
expanding, export-oriented, and private sector–driven economy to achieve higher rates of 
growth. Accordingly, the following period has been one of considerable socioeconomic 
change in the region characterized by adoption of economic liberalization policies and a 
declining role of the state as an employer in the labor market. 
This paper explores some of the equity implications of this transition by 
examining changes in the distribution of returns to education and gender wage premia in 
the Egyptian and Moroccan labor market in the 1990s. This is accomplished by 
estimating joint models of educational choice and wage determination for both countries 
yielding selectivity corrected returns to different levels of education, from which a crude 
estimate of the private rate of return is calculated. Thus compared to previous research, 
our results appropriately correct for educational-selection bias and are based on strictly 
comparable estimation models for both countries. 
 In line with theoretical expectation, as in MENA educational credentials do not 
reflect productivity differences, but are well rewarded in the public sector, a reduction in 
the role of the public sector lead to lower returns in the private sector and falling returns 
over time. Only at the university level,  are returns higher in the private sector in Egypt 
indicating that employers place relatively little value on basic and secondary education. 
In Morocco there is some evidence of higher returns in the private sector by the end of 
the 1990, which might be indicative of better matching of educational credentials and 
productivity differences. These results, however, need to be interpreted with care, 
especially for females, due to insignificant estimates associated with small sample size. 
Overall, returns to education results indicate clear wage compression for all sectors in 
Egypt, and for some, but not all groups in Morocco.  
 However, as indicted in the introduction, a reduction in educational premia does 
not necessarily mean that wage inequality is reduced, as wage inequality along other 
dimensions, such as gender and sector might increase. Oaxaca-Blinder wages-
differentials decompositions of sector and gender wage gap for Egypt and Morocco 
indicate the unexplained component in public wage premia and gender gaps have 
declined in Egypt, but substantially increased in Morocco over the 1990s. Overall, 
economic liberalization and public sector retrenchment which were much more 
comprehensive in Morocco appear to have had a more dislocating effect also on labor 
market wage outcomes. 
 15 
 
The following are three possible areas of policy implications and future research 
emanating from the results in this paper. 
 
VI. 1 Educational reform  
On the whole, the evidence on rates of return suggests that, at least in terms of education, 
public sector wage setting practices leads to wage contraction over time in an effort to 
protect lower strata wage earners from inflation.  Yet by rewarding educational 
credentials in public employment with higher wages, governments have encouraged 
investment in types of human capital that are not necessarily valued in the private sector.  
The problem is most acute in primary and secondary education, which has experienced 
significant expansion in the region to accommodate growing numbers of enrollees, often 
at the expense of quality (World Bank, 2004).   
The most recent Arab Human Development Report (UNDP, 2003) has 
highlighted the deep seated institutional, political and economic problems faced by 
education in the region. One central theme in the report is that a very important reason for 
a slow/stagnating growth in the region is the insufficient nature of skill acquisition or the 
lack of “knowledge worker”. This is closely linked to the issue of deteriorating quality of 
education at all levels -- a phenomenon that remains difficult to measure in MENA 
countries due to the lack of accurate and reliable data.  
The recent decline in the number of school-age children in many countries of the 
region provides an excellent opportunity to re-focus efforts on quality improvements and 
greater responsiveness to the needs of the private sector (World Bank, 2004).  The reform 
of vocational secondary and higher institute technical education systems in MENA is 
now quite high on the policy agenda. This is particularly the case for a country like 
Egypt, which more than any other Arab or even developing country has based its 
development aspirations, and invested substantial resources, in the cause of technical 
education.
12
 Recent analysis shows that the pattern of growth of technical education had 
little to do with a rational planning exercise or even focused on how to provide young 
people with workplace relevant skills. Instead it was related to haphazard efforts to divert 
students aspiring for higher education. Today technical education graduates are the group 
of the population hit most by the inadequacies of the education system, as attested by 
their high unemployment rates (Antoninis, 2001). 
  The scarcity of studies evaluating the effectiveness of vocational and technical 
schools in MENA has been noted in recent surveys (see for e.g. Gill and Heyneman, 
2000). Thus a first possible extension to the analysis in this paper is to introduce the 
distinction between different types of secondary education, in order to contribute to the 
debate on relative benefits of vocational versus general education and draw some 
concrete policy proposals for the reform of these systems. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 The expansion of an extensive system of technical schools and higher education was directly linked to 
the Nasserist experiment of industrialization in the 1960s, and the subsequent need to recruit engineers, 
technocrats and technicians in the expanding public sector. The state enacted a guarantee to hire all 
vocational secondary, technical higher institute and university graduates in the public sector, which over 
the years fuelled a rapid expansion in number of spirants for such degrees.   
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VI.2  Public sector retrenchment and civil service reform. 
The notion that a large premium for public sector employees can persist suggests that 
markets are not performing appropriately. If markets were efficient, private sector 
workers would compete for higher-paying public jobs, which eventually would disappear. 
One possible explanation is that a large premium may indicate market failures in form of 
information deficiencies, skill mismatches and/or barriers to entry as well as the fact that 
wages in the public sector are politically determined. Another plausible explanation is 
that the public sector remains a model employer that does not discriminate against 
females, this is backed up by the results on discrimination reported above. Hence efforts 
to downsize and reform public sector pay systems should not necessarily take the private 
sector wage as the efficient benchmark. There is a need to conduct deeper inequality 
analysis and study in more detail the internal labor market within the public sector. At the 
very least, a differentiation between the government and state-owned enterprises should 
be introduced.  
Another  possible direction is to use quantile regression methods to test whether the 
distribution of public (versus private) wage and male (versus female) premiums differs 
across wage quantiles in each occupation within the public sector.  The procedure throws 
light on the internal labor market in the public sector in terms of the distribution of wages 
and gender differentials for different quantiles. It also facilitates examining whether 
public sector wage premia (compared to the private sector) exist only for certain 
occupations at certain levels (for example, the lower wage echelons) rather than others.     
 
VI. 3 Improving access of women to private sector jobs.    
Finally, given the favorable treatment of women in the government compared to the 
private sector and the lower levels of discrimination there, it is likely that the burden of 
privatization and civil service downsizing may fall disproportionately on women and may 
negatively affect the already low participation rates, unless effort is made to reduce the 
extent of gender-based discrimination in the private sector. In that respect, public policy 
focus on education and training as keys to a more equitable access to opportunities and 
the benefits of development for women may be insufficient. Providing women with more 
education and training would not necessarily reduce earnings differentials between males 
and females in the private sector. Social policy prescriptions call for further investigation 
into the reasons why females are concentrated in subordinate labor groups and why they 
appear to be paid less for similar human capital endowments in some segments of the 
private sector. 
  In order to shed more lights on channels of discrimination, a possible extension of 
the analysis in this paper is to incorporate occupational attainment more formally in order  
to further decompose the gender gap into components attributable to pure pay 
discrimination within occupations as opposed to entry barriers or inter-occupational 
segregation. 
In sum, future drafts of this paper will seek to introduce several useful distinctions 
such as between vocational and secondary education and public enterprise and 
government employment. They will also seek to conduct a deeper analysis of wage 
inequality decompositions, possibly by drawing on quantile regressions and/or 
occupational segregation analysis methodologies. 
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Table (1): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Public Sector Males School of Choice,  
Egypt 1988 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
    -
0.010    
    -
0.003    
     
0.005    
     
0.004    
     
0.015    
              
(0.011)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.015)    
M.educ. 
(illit=
Base)  
    -
0.138*** 
    -
0.075*** 
    -
0.023    
     
0.039*** 
     
0.302*** 
              
(0.012)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.013)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.033)    
F.Educ. 
(Illit=
Base) 
F.Read&
Write 
    -
0.092*** 
    -
0.037*** 
     
0.028*** 
     
0.032*** 
     
0.149*** 
              
(0.011)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.018)    
F.Prima
ry 
    -
0.106*** 
    -
0.058*** 
    -
0.012    
     
0.032*** 
     
0.222*** 
              
(0.014)    
   
(0.011)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.042)    
F.Secon
dary 
    -
0.167*** 
    -
0.119*** 
    -
0.172**  
    -
0.005    
     
0.569*** 
              
(0.017)    
   
(0.018)    
   
(0.060)    
   
(0.027)    
   
(0.123)    
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F.Unive
risity 
    -
0.168*** 
    -
0.115*** 
    -
0.143*** 
     
0.008    
     
0.528*** 
              
(0.012)    
   
(0.012)    
   
(0.032)    
   
(0.012)    
   
(0.064)    
Sib<=6      
0.010*   
     
0.003*   
    -
0.004*   
    -
0.003*   
    -
0.014*   
              
(0.004)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.006)    
Sib>6        
0.009*** 
     
0.003*** 
    -
0.004*** 
    -
0.003*** 
    -
0.013*** 
              
(0.002)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.003)    
 
Table (2): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Private Sector Males School of Choice,  
Egypt 1988 
             
Read&Write 
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
    -
0.004    
     
0.068*** 
     
0.066*** 
     
0.007*** 
     
0.015*** 
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.011)    
   
(0.011)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.003)    
M.educ. 
(illit=
Base)  
    -
0.092*** 
     
0.056*** 
     
0.219*** 
     
0.035*** 
     
0.084*** 
              
(0.014)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.025)    
   
(0.008)    
   
(0.016)    
F.Educ. 
(Illit=
Base) 
F.Read&
    -
0.037*** 
     
0.086*** 
     
0.131*** 
     
0.016*** 
     
0.036*** 
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Write 
              
(0.007)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.015)    
   
(0.003)    
   
(0.006)    
F.Prima
ry 
    -
0.089*** 
     
0.046**  
     
0.202*** 
     
0.032*** 
     
0.077*** 
              
(0.017)    
   
(0.015)    
   
(0.029)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.020)    
F.Secon
dary 
    -
0.143*** 
    -
0.040    
     
0.261*** 
     
0.061*   
     
0.176    
              
(0.036)    
   
(0.074)    
   
(0.024)    
   
(0.027)    
   
(0.103)    
F.Unive
risity 
    -
0.161*** 
    -
0.077    
     
0.263*** 
     
0.074*** 
     
0.241**  
              
(0.019)    
   
(0.044)    
   
(0.023)    
   
(0.019)    
   
(0.076)    
Sib<=6      
0.003*   
    -
0.024*** 
    -
0.024*** 
    -
0.003*** 
    -
0.006*** 
              
(0.001)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.001)    
Sib>6       -
0.000    
     
0.004*   
     
0.005*   
     
0.000*   
     
0.001*   
              
(0.000)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.000)    
   
(0.000)    
 24 
 
Table (3): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Public Sector Females School of Choice,  
Egypt 1988 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
     
0.001    
     
0.002    
     
0.016    
    -
0.004    
    -
0.017    
              
(0.002)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.040)    
   
(0.010)    
   
(0.044)    
M.educ. 
(illit=
Base)  
    -
0.010**  
    -
0.028*** 
    -
0.198*** 
     
0.040*** 
     
0.226*** 
              
(0.004)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.033)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.037)    
F.Educ. 
(Illit=
Base) 
F.Read&
Write 
    -
0.002    
    -
0.005    
    -
0.034    
     
0.009    
     
0.038    
              
(0.002)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.032)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.035)    
F.Prima
ry 
    -
0.003    
    -
0.007    
    -
0.054    
     
0.012    
     
0.060    
              
(0.002)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.056)    
   
(0.010)    
   
(0.063)    
F.Secon
dary 
    -
0.008*   
    -
0.023**  
    -
0.244**  
     
0.000    
     
0.298*   
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.092)    
   
(0.027)    
   
(0.129)    
F.Unive     -     -     -     -      
 25 
risity 0.011**  0.034*** 0.401*** 0.054    0.535*** 
              
(0.004)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.046)    
   
(0.030)    
   
(0.076)    
Sib<=6      
0.001    
     
0.003    
     
0.018    
    -
0.005    
    -
0.020    
              
(0.001)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.015)    
Sib>6        
0.001    
     
0.002    
     
0.014*   
    -
0.004    
    -
0.015*   
              
(0.000)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.007)    
 
 
Table (4): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Private Sector Females School of Choice,  
Egypt 1988 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
     
0.004    
     
0.086    
     
0.295    
     
0.027    
     
0.061    
           (2922.
545)    
(5435.
008)    
(3682.
102)    
(1088
.472)    
(2800.
997)    
M.educ. 
(illit=
Base)  
    -
0.044    
    -
0.038    
     
0.304    
     
0.056    
     
0.150    
           (1897.
653)    
(7194.
981)    
(6027.
111)    
(1457
.749)    
(6048.
847)    
F.Educ. 
(Illit=
Base) 
F.Read&
    -
0.027    
    -
0.001    
     
0.239    
     
0.032    
     
0.076    
 26 
Write 
           (1869.
856)    
(6122.
751)    
(1401.
908)    
(1081
.793)    
(3309.
750)    
F.Prima
ry 
    -
0.042    
    -
0.046    
     
0.259    
     
0.048    
     
0.128    
           (1428.
360)    
(6422.
907)    
(5856.
503)    
(1302
.476)    
(5218.
883)    
F.Secon
dary 
    -
0.080**  
    -
0.181*** 
    -
0.211*** 
    -
0.012*   
     
0.975*** 
              
(0.025)    
   
(0.034)    
   
(0.035)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.008)    
F.Unive
risity 
    -
0.065    
    -
0.122    
     
0.194    
     
0.085    
     
0.332    
            
(744.049)    
(5249.
330)    
(14788
.736)    
 
(270.773)    
(10137
.066)    
Sib<=6     -
0.000    
     
0.000    
     
0.001    
     
0.000    
     
0.000    
             
(17.067)    
  
(35.995)    
  
(17.932)    
   
(5.313)    
  
(13.056)    
Sib>6        
0.000    
    -
0.001    
    -
0.005    
    -
0.000    
    -
0.001    
             
(61.032)    
 
(128.720)    
  
(64.127)    
  
(19.001)    
  
(46.689)    
 
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocc 
Table (5): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Public Sector Males School of Choice,  
Egypt 1998 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Prep.    
  
Secondary    
  
University+    
Region     -     -                
 27 
(Rural=Base)  0.048*** 0.058*** 0.006    0.029*** 0.113*** 
              
(0.010)    
   
(0.011)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.019)    
M.educ. 
(illit=
Base)  
    -
0.056*** 
    -
0.087*** 
    -
0.050*** 
     
0.030*** 
     
0.206*** 
              
(0.008)    
   
(0.012)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.032)    
F.Educ. 
(Illit=
Base) 
F.Read&
Write 
    -
0.036*** 
    -
0.051*** 
    -
0.012*   
     
0.022*** 
     
0.107*** 
              
(0.007)    
   
(0.010)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.021)    
F.Prima
ry 
    -
0.040*** 
    -
0.065**  
    -
0.043    
     
0.021*** 
     
0.158*   
              
(0.012)    
   
(0.022)    
   
(0.027)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.064)    
F.Secon
dary 
    -
0.076*** 
    -
0.143*** 
    -
0.219*** 
    -
0.020    
     
0.511*** 
              
(0.009)    
   
(0.017)    
   
(0.051)    
   
(0.025)    
   
(0.098)    
F.Unive
risity 
    -
0.069*** 
    -
0.124*** 
    -
0.150*** 
     
0.009    
     
0.383*** 
              
(0.009)    
   
(0.017)    
   
(0.040)    
   
(0.012)    
   
(0.077)    
Sib<=6                    -     -
 28 
0.002    0.003    0.000    0.001    0.006    
              
(0.004)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.010)    
Sib>6        
0.016*** 
     
0.022*** 
     
0.003    
    -
0.010*** 
    -
0.044*** 
              
(0.002)    
   
(0.003)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.005)    
 
Table (6): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of 
Private Sector Males School of Choice, Egypt 1998 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
 
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
    -
0.020*** 
     
0.064*** 
     
0.077*** 
     
0.017*** 
     
0.037*** 
              
(0.006)    
   
(0.015)    
   
(0.015)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.008)    
M.educ. 
(illit=
Base)  
    -
0.089*** 
     
0.018    
     
0.148*** 
     
0.046*** 
     
0.123*** 
              
(0.017)    
   
(0.017)    
   
(0.022)    
   
(0.012)    
   
(0.028)    
F.Educ. 
(Rural=
Base) 
F.Read&
Write 
    -
0.022*   
     
0.031*** 
     
0.051**  
     
0.012*   
     
0.028**  
              
(0.009)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.017)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.010)    
F.Prima     -                     
 29 
ry 0.066*   0.016    0.109**  0.032    0.083    
              
(0.032)    
   
(0.021)    
   
(0.039)    
   
(0.017)    
   
(0.048)    
F.Secon
dary 
    -
0.169*** 
    -
0.172    
     
0.072    
     
0.077**  
     
0.483    
              
(0.032)    
   
(0.091)    
   
(0.126)    
   
(0.027)    
   
(0.288)    
F.Unive
risity 
-    
0.171*** 
    -
0.167**  
     
0.079    
     
0.078*** 
     
0.484**  
              
(0.022)    
   
(0.053)    
   
(0.073)    
   
(0.020)    
   
(0.164)    
Sib<=6     -
0.001    
     
0.002    
     
0.002    
     
0.001    
     
0.001    
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.008)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.004)    
Sib>6        
0.010*** 
    -
0.020*** 
    -
0.027*** 
    -
0.006*** 
    -
0.014*** 
              
(0.002)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.002)    
 
Table (7): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Public Sector Females School of Choice,  
Egypt 1998 
             
Read&Write   
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
    -
0.001    
    -
0.003    
    -
0.030    
     
0.004    
     
0.032    
              
(0.002)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.043)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.046)    
M.educ. 
(illit=
    -
0.006*   
    -
0.019*** 
    -
0.190*** 
     
0.008    
     
0.217*** 
 30 
Base)  
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.033)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.038)    
F.Educ. 
(Illit=
Base) 
F.Read&
Write 
     
0.002    
     
0.005    
     
0.048    
    -
0.005    
    -
0.053    
              
(0.001)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.034)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.037)    
F.Prima
ry 
     
0.002    
     
0.007    
     
0.056    
    -
0.009    
    -
0.060    
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.065)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.068)    
F.Secon
dary 
    -
0.006*   
    -
0.019*** 
    -
0.280*** 
    -
0.065    
     
0.380*** 
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.066)    
   
(0.042)    
   
(0.111)    
F.Unive
risity 
    -
0.006*   
    -
0.019*** 
    -
0.256*** 
    -
0.038    
     
0.329*** 
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.049)    
   
(0.023)    
   
(0.075)    
Sib<=6     -
0.000    
    -
0.001    
    -
0.005    
     
0.001    
     
0.006    
              
(0.001)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.019)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.020)    
Sib>6        
0.001    
     
0.002    
     
0.019    
    -
0.002    
    -
0.021    
 31 
              
(0.000)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.010)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.011)    
 
 
Table (8 ): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Private Sector Females School of Choice,  
Egypt 1998 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
    -
0.015    
     
0.044    
     
0.285    
     
0.070    
     
0.139    
           (5896.
621)    
(12090
.425)    
(2955.
920)    
(3551
.523)    
(10558
.307)    
M.educ. 
(illit=
Base)  
    -
0.066    
    -
0.110    
     
0.088    
     
0.096    
     
0.347    
            
(873.743)    
(7850.
112)    
(24781
.849)    
(1607
.698)    
(17551
.279)    
F.Educ. 
(Illit=
Base) 
F.Read&
Write 
    -
0.048    
    -
0.078    
     
0.100    
     
0.072    
     
0.200    
            
(574.312)    
(6725.
769)    
(18278
.714)    
 
(545.550)    
(12184
.578)    
F.Prima
ry 
    -
0.044    
    -
0.088    
     
0.030    
     
0.065    
     
0.217    
            
(647.263)    
(3179.
349)    
(19184
.355)    
(1080
.518)    
(11706
.985)    
F.Secon
dary 
    -
0.081*   
    -
0.186**  
    -
0.289*** 
    -
0.041    
     
0.931*** 
 32 
              
(0.040)    
   
(0.061)    
   
(0.073)    
   
(0.023)    
   
(0.029)    
F.Unive
risity 
    -
0.063    
    -
0.137    
    -
0.060    
     
0.075    
     
0.437    
           (1369.
971)    
(2068.
925)    
(25335
.850)    
(5502
.349)    
(15761
.184)    
Sib<=6     -
0.008    
    -
0.008    
     
0.029    
     
0.011    
     
0.023    
            
(344.419)    
(1767.
603)    
(2111.
372)    
 
(426.355)    
(1651.
584)    
Sib>6        
0.000    
     
0.000    
    -
0.001    
    -
0.000    
    -
0.001    
             
(12.623)    
  
(64.785)    
  
(77.384)    
  
(15.626)    
  
(60.533)    
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Table (9): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Public Sector Males 
School of Choice,  Morocco 1991 
 
            
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
    -
0.013    
     
0.074    
     
0.108    
     
0.108    
     
0.099    
           (22995.
500)    
(23736.8
16)    
(1350.8
29)    
(12249.
532)    
(19588.
823)    
M.educ
. 
(illit
=Base)  
    -
0.083    
    -
0.090    
     
0.001    
     
0.107    
     
0.257    
           (1395.8
02)    
(17682.0
61)    
(28135.
646)    
(17900.
396)    
(32133.
325)    
F.Educ
. 
(Illit
=Base) 
F.Read
&Write 
    -
0.028    
     
0.038    
     
0.080    
     
0.088    
     
0.084    
           (16503.
435)    
(22321.3
18)    
(4459.1
72)    
(8598.0
24)    
(16330.
162)    
F.Prim
ary 
    -
0.042    
    -
0.022    
     
0.032    
     
0.069    
     
0.092    
           (3679.8
16)    
(16078.7
14)    
(12699.
071)    
 
(201.893)    
(15453.
814)    
F.Prep
. 
    -
0.098    
    -
0.116    
    -
0.022    
     
0.105    
     
0.346    
 34 
           (3184.3
72)    
(16318.5
61)    
(31090.
252)    
(27021.
968)    
(36470.
580)    
F.Seco
ndary 
    -
0.124*** 
    -
0.207*** 
    -
0.176*** 
    -
0.147*** 
    -
0.124*** 
              
(0.018)    
   
(0.022)    
   
(0.020)    
   
(0.018)    
   
(0.017)    
F. 
Univ. 
    -
0.082    
    -
0.087    
     
0.003    
     
0.106    
     
0.249    
           (1186.7
24)    
(17804.7
97)    
(27717.
647)    
(16971.
538)    
(31580.
497)    
 
 
Table (10): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Private Sector Males 
School of Choice,  Morocco 1991 
 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
F.Educ
. 
(Illit
=Base) 
F.Read
&Write 
    -
0.028    
    -
0.033    
    -
0.015    
    -
0.018    
    -
0.007    
              
(0.031)    
   
(0.045)    
   
(0.023)    
   
(0.028)    
   
(0.010)    
F.Prim
ary 
    -
0.074    
    -
0.056    
    -
0.023    
    -
0.026    
    -
0.009    
              
(0.055)    
   
(0.034)    
   
(0.013)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.005)    
F.Prep
. 
    -
0.005    
    -
0.004    
    -
0.002    
    -
0.002    
    -
0.001    
 35 
              
(0.055)    
   
(0.051)    
   
(0.022)    
   
(0.026)    
   
(0.009)    
Sib<=6     -
0.013*   
    -
0.013*   
    -
0.006*   
    -
0.007*   
    -
0.002    
              
(0.006)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.003)    
   
(0.003)    
   
(0.001)    
Sib>6       -
0.008**  
    -
0.008**  
    -
0.004**  
    -
0.004**  
    -
0.002*   
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.003)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.001)    
 
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocco. 
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Table (11): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Public Sector Females 
School of Choice,  Morocco 1991 
 
            
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
Prepa
ratory    
  
Secondary    
 
University    
F.Educ
. 
(Illit
=Base) 
F.Read
&Write 
    
-0.018    
    
-0.027    
    -
0.008    
     
0.054    
     
0.042    
              
(0.039)    
   
(0.053)    
   
(0.010)    
   
(0.115)    
   
(0.081)    
F.Prim
ary 
    
-0.005    
    
-0.007    
    -
0.004    
     
0.014    
     
0.012    
              
(0.040)    
   
(0.066)    
   
(0.037)    
   
(0.118)    
   
(0.114)    
F.Prep
. 
     
0.027    
     
0.036    
     
0.003    
    
-0.079    
    
-0.054    
              
(0.051)    
   
(0.055)    
   
(0.026)    
   
(0.147)    
   
(0.082)    
Sib<=6     
-0.007    
    
-0.010    
    -
0.005    
     
0.020    
     
0.017    
              
(0.010)    
   
(0.016)    
   
(0.008)    
   
(0.029)    
   
(0.025)    
Sib>6        
0.005    
     
0.008    
     
0.004    
    
-0.015    
    
-0.013    
              
(0.005)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.012)    
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Table (12): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Private Sector 
Females School of Choice,  Morocco 1991 
 
            
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
 
University    
F.Educ
. 
(Illit
=Base) 
F.Read
&Write 
    -
0.018    
    -
0.027    
    -
0.008    
     
0.054    
     
0.042    
              
(0.039)    
   
(0.053)    
   
(0.010)    
   
(0.115)    
   
(0.081)    
F.Prim
ary 
    -
0.005    
    -
0.007    
    -
0.004    
     
0.014    
     
0.012    
              
(0.040)    
   
(0.066)    
   
(0.037)    
   
(0.118)    
   
(0.114)    
F.Prep
. 
     
0.027    
     
0.036    
     
0.003    
    -
0.079    
    -
0.054    
              
(0.051)    
   
(0.055)    
   
(0.026)    
   
(0.147)    
   
(0.082)    
Sib<=6     -
0.007    
    -
0.010    
    -
0.005    
     
0.020    
     
0.017    
              
(0.010)    
   
(0.016)    
   
(0.008)    
   
(0.029)    
   
(0.025)    
Sib>6        
0.005    
     
0.008    
     
0.004    
    -
0.015    
    -
0.013    
              
(0.005)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.012)    
 
 38 
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocco. 
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Table (13): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Public Sector Males School of Choice,  
Morocco 1999 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
    -
0.044*** 
    -
0.011    
     
0.061*   
     
0.081*** 
     
0.069*** 
              
(0.013)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.027)    
   
(0.025)    
   
(0.019)    
M.educ
. 
(illit
=Base)  
    -
0.034    
    -
0.032    
     
0.008    
     
0.056    
     
0.072    
              
(0.030)    
   
(0.035)    
   
(0.011)    
   
(0.048)    
   
(0.080)    
F.Educ
. 
(Illit
=Base) 
F.Read
&Write 
     
0.102    
     
0.096    
    -
0.003    
    -
0.157**  
    -
0.269    
              
(0.054)    
   
(0.058)    
   
(0.047)    
   
(0.054)    
   
(0.235)    
F.Prim
ary 
     
0.064*   
     
0.012    
    -
0.097    
    -
0.128    
    -
0.113    
              
(0.028)    
   
(0.034)    
   
(0.102)    
   
(0.100)    
   
(0.083)    
F.Prep
. 
     
0.049**  
    -
0.002    
    -
0.092    
    -
0.104    
    -
0.083    
                          
 40 
(0.016)    (0.061)    (0.126)    (0.093)    (0.062)    
F.Seco
ndary 
     
0.041    
     
0.006    
    -
0.063    
    -
0.078    
    -
0.064    
              
(0.043)    
   
(0.044)    
   
(0.145)    
   
(0.119)    
   
(0.081)    
F. 
Univ. 
    -
0.001    
    -
0.001    
     
0.001    
     
0.002    
     
0.002    
    
(0.100)    
   
(0.070)    
   
(0.069)    
   
(0.168)    
   
(0.173)    
Sib<=6      
0.008    
     
0.006    
    -
0.006    
    -
0.013    
    -
0.014    
              
(0.006)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.010)    
   
(0.010)    
Sib>6        
0.015*** 
     
0.011*** 
    -
0.011**  
    -
0.026*** 
    -
0.026*** 
              
(0.004)    
   
(0.003)    
   
(0.003)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.005)    
 
 
Table (14): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Private Sector Males School of Choice,  
Morocco 1999 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
     
0.115*** 
     
0.095*** 
     
0.038*** 
     
0.019*** 
     
0.010*** 
              
(0.016)    
   
(0.012)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.003)    
M.educ
. 
(illit
     
0.045**  
     
0.117**  
     
0.063    
     
0.035    
     
0.019    
 41 
=Base)  
              
(0.017)    
   
(0.042)    
   
(0.033)    
   
(0.020)    
   
(0.012)    
F.Educ
. 
(Illit
=Base) 
F.Read
&Write 
    -
0.070*** 
    -
0.130*   
    -
0.066    
    -
0.036    
    -
0.019    
              
(0.011)    
   
(0.063)    
   
(0.044)    
   
(0.027)    
   
(0.015)    
F.Prim
ary 
    -
0.060    
    -
0.045    
    -
0.017    
    -
0.008    
    -
0.004    
              
(0.075)    
   
(0.047)    
   
(0.017)    
   
(0.008)    
   
(0.004)    
F.Prep
. 
     
0.044    
     
0.060    
     
0.027    
     
0.014    
     
0.007    
              
(0.030)    
   
(0.074)    
   
(0.038)    
   
(0.020)    
   
(0.011)    
F.Seco
ndary 
     
0.044    
     
0.115    
     
0.063    
     
0.035    
     
0.019    
              
(0.030)    
   
(0.082)    
   
(0.065)    
   
(0.040)    
   
(0.024)    
F. 
Univ. 
     
0.048*** 
     
0.099    
     
0.051    
     
0.027    
     
0.015    
    
(0.014)    
   
(0.087)    
   
(0.059)    
   
(0.035)    
   
(0.020)    
Sib<=6     -     -     -     -     -
 42 
0.011    0.010    0.004    0.002    0.001    
              
(0.006)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.001)    
Sib>6       -
0.004    
    -
0.004    
    -
0.002    
    -
0.001    
    -
0.000    
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.000)    
   
(0.000)    
 
Table (15): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Public Sector Females School of Choice,  
Morocco 1999 
              
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
    -
0.043    
    -
0.011    
     
0.212    
     
0.181*** 
     
0.177*** 
              
(0.049)    
   
(0.060)    
   
(0.163)    
   
(0.054)    
   
(0.040)    
M.educ
. 
(illit
=Base)  
    -
0.021    
    -
0.026    
    -
0.057    
     
0.044    
     
0.113    
              
(0.018)    
   
(0.024)    
   
(0.070)    
   
(0.031)    
   
(0.122)    
F.Educ
. 
(Illit
=Base) 
F.Read
&Write 
     
0.067    
     
0.075    
     
0.105    
    -
0.135*   
    -
0.326    
              
(0.041)    
   
(0.039)    
   
(0.059)    
   
(0.054)    
   
(0.218)    
 43 
F.Prim
ary 
     
0.067*   
     
0.045    
    -
0.123    
    -
0.199**  
    -
0.250**  
              
(0.029)    
   
(0.034)    
   
(0.120)    
   
(0.069)    
   
(0.085)    
F.Prep
. 
     
0.020    
     
0.022    
     
0.017    
    -
0.049    
    -
0.074    
              
(0.052)    
   
(0.053)    
   
(0.015)    
   
(0.123)    
   
(0.162)    
F.Seco
ndary 
     
0.020    
     
0.022    
     
0.013    
    -
0.048    
    -
0.069    
              
(0.054)    
   
(0.053)    
   
(0.019)    
   
(0.128)    
   
(0.154)    
F. 
Univ. 
     
0.032    
     
0.032    
    -
0.002    
    -
0.077    
    -
0.098    
    
(0.063)    
   
(0.049)    
   
(0.104)    
   
(0.148)    
   
(0.142)    
Sib<=6     -
0.004    
    -
0.005    
    -
0.007    
     
0.010    
     
0.019    
              
(0.006)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.010)    
   
(0.014)    
   
(0.024)    
Sib>6       -
0.003    
    -
0.003    
    -
0.004    
     
0.006    
     
0.011    
              
(0.003)    
   
(0.003)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.007)    
   
(0.012)    
 
 
Table (16): Marginal Effects of Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logit Estimation of Private Sector Females School of Choice,  
Morocco 1999 
             
Read&Write    
  
Primary    
  
Preparatory    
  
Secondary    
  
University    
 44 
Region 
(Rural=Base)  
     
0.132*** 
     
0.084*** 
     
0.049*** 
     
0.017**  
     
0.010*   
              
(0.032)    
   
(0.019)    
   
(0.012)    
   
(0.006)    
   
(0.004)    
M.educ
. 
(illit
=Base)  
    -
0.023    
     
0.123**  
     
0.210**  
     
0.125    
     
0.096    
              
(0.075)    
   
(0.044)    
   
(0.069)    
   
(0.081)    
   
(0.077)    
F.Educ
. 
(Illit
=Base) 
F.Read
&Write 
    -
0.087**  
    -
0.144    
    -
0.133    
    -
0.056    
    -
0.036    
              
(0.032)    
   
(0.083)    
   
(0.136)    
   
(0.073)    
   
(0.052)    
F.Prim
ary 
    -
0.100    
    -
0.064    
    -
0.037    
    -
0.012    
    -
0.007    
              
(0.115)    
   
(0.062)    
   
(0.035)    
   
(0.012)    
   
(0.007)    
F.Prep
. 
    -
0.044    
    -
0.031    
    -
0.019    
    -
0.006    
    -
0.004    
              
(0.138)    
   
(0.086)    
   
(0.050)    
   
(0.017)    
   
(0.010)    
F.Seco
ndary 
     
0.057    
     
0.074    
     
0.058    
     
0.022    
     
0.014    
 45 
              
(0.041)    
   
(0.140)    
   
(0.139)    
   
(0.059)    
   
(0.038)    
F. 
Univ. 
    -
0.062    
    -
0.041    
    -
0.024    
    -
0.008    
    -
0.005    
    
(0.133)    
   
(0.074)    
   
(0.041)    
   
(0.013)    
   
(0.008)    
Sib<=6      
0.011    
     
0.009    
     
0.006    
     
0.002    
     
0.001    
              
(0.011)    
   
(0.009)    
   
(0.005)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.001)    
Sib>6        
0.001    
     
0.001    
     
0.000    
     
0.000    
     
0.000    
              
(0.005)    
   
(0.004)    
   
(0.002)    
   
(0.001)    
   
(0.000)    
 
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocco. 
 
 
 
Table (17) Regression Results, Egypt, Males, 1988 
Public Males, 1988  Private Males, 1988 
 Log 
Real Wage 
Log 
Real Wage 
Log 
Real Wage 
Log 
Real Wage 
exp 0.060 0.058 0.067 0.055 
 (0.00
4)** 
(0.00
6)** 
(0.00
5)** 
(0.00
6)** 
exp2 -
0.062 
-
0.061 
-
0.116 
-
0.092 
 (0.00
8)** 
(0.01
2)** 
(0.01
0)** 
(0.01
2)** 
Urban(rural 0.182 0.194 - -
 46 
=base) 0.034 0.058 
 (0.02
9)** 
(0.03
0)** 
(0.04
3) 
(0.04
3) 
Read&write 0.129 -
0.041 
0.057 0.347 
 (0.04
4)** 
(0.11
2) 
(0.04
8) 
(0.11
4)** 
Primary 0.287 0.547 0.093 -
0.024 
 (0.04
9)** 
(0.20
5)** 
(0.05
0) 
(0.09
3) 
Prep. 0.702 0.572 0.285 0.167 
 (0.04
7)** 
(0.13
9)** 
(0.05
8)** 
(0.10
2) 
Secondary 0.850 0.684 0.238 -
0.558 
 (0.06
5)** 
(0.18
0)** 
(0.12
7) 
(0.28
3)* 
University 1.127 1.099 0.675 0.662 
 (0.05
0)** 
(0.05
7)** 
(0.08
2)** 
(0.08
3)** 
lambdam -
0.063 
-
0.063 
-
0.130 
-
0.129 
 (0.03
5) 
(0.03
5) 
(0.06
2)* 
(0.06
1)* 
Primary*Exp  0.000  -
0.000 
  0.002  (0.00
 47 
0)* 
Primary*Exp
2 
 (0.00
0)* 
 -
0.014 
  (0.00
6) 
 (0.00
7) 
Prep*Exp  -
0.025 
 0.015 
  (0.01
6) 
 (0.01
3) 
Prep*Exp2  0.047  -
0.028 
  (0.02
9) 
 (0.03
8) 
Secon*Exp  0.007  -
0.004 
  (0.01
3) 
 (0.01
7) 
Secon*Exp2  -
0.006 
 0.123 
  (0.03
0) 
 (0.06
1)* 
Univ*Exp  0.015  0.164 
  (0.02
1) 
 (0.06
5)* 
Univ*Exp2  -
0.026 
 -
0.497 
  (0.05
4) 
 (0.27
8) 
 48 
Constant -
0.962 
-
0.916 
-
0.113 
-
0.001 
 (0.07
8)** 
(0.09
7)** 
(0.06
9) 
(0.07
9) 
Observation
s 
1689 1689 1595 1595 
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.16 0.18 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
    
* 
significant at 5% 
level; ** 
significant at 1% 
level 
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   Table (18) Regression Results, Egypt 1988 
Public Females  Private Females 
 lrhr
wg 
lrhr
wg 
lrhr
wg 
lrhr
wg 
exp 0.08
3 
0.05
8 
0.05
7 
0.04
1 
 (0.0
07)** 
(0.0
06)** 
(0.0
14)** 
(0.0
16)* 
exp2 -
0.111 
-
0.061 
-
0.097 
-
0.069 
 (0.0
19)** 
(0.0
12)** 
(0.0
31)** 
(0.0
35) 
Urban(rural
=base) 
0.14
5 
0.20
3 
-
0.002 
0.06
1 
 (0.0
57)* 
(0.0
30)** 
(0.1
97) 
(0.1
97) 
Read&write 0.12
1 
-
0.032 
0.06
5 
0.77
5 
 (0.1
99) 
(0.1
12) 
(0.2
44) 
(0.5
60) 
Primary 0.40
7 
0.55
7 
0.24
2 
0.04
1 
 (0.1
44)** 
(0.2
05)** 
(0.1
68) 
(0.3
51) 
Prep. 0.92
0 
0.59
7 
0.32
4 
-
0.090 
 (0.1
11)** 
(0.1
39)** 
(0.1
49)* 
(0.2
76) 
Secondary 1.06 0.70 - -
 50 
9 5 0.098 0.689 
 (0.1
19)** 
(0.1
81)** 
(0.2
96) 
(0.8
00) 
University 1.35
4 
1.12
2 
1.24
5 
1.17
9 
 (0.1
17)** 
(0.0
54)** 
(0.1
72)** 
(0.1
74)** 
lambdam -
0.020 
-
0.045 
0.20
2 
0.27
0 
 (0.0
60) 
(0.0
43) 
(0.2
58) 
(0.2
58) 
Primary*Exp  0.00
0 
 -
0.000 
  (0.0
00)* 
 -
0.339 
Primary*Exp
2 
 0.00
2 
 (0.0
00) 
  (0.0
06) 
 (0.1
76) 
Prep*Exp  -
0.024 
 0.01
2 
  (0.0
16) 
 (0.0
47) 
Prep*Exp2  0.04
5 
 0.00
9 
  (0.0
29) 
 (0.1
13) 
Secon*Exp  0.00  0.06
 51 
7 9 
  (0.0
13) 
 (0.0
56) 
Secon*Exp2  -
0.005 
 -
0.120 
  (0.0
30) 
 (0.2
28) 
Univ*Exp  0.01
4 
 0.16
5 
  (0.0
21) 
 (0.4
04) 
Univ*Exp2  -
0.025 
 -
0.443 
  (0.0
54) 
 (3.2
04) 
Constant -
1.410 
-
0.939 
-
0.725 
-
0.637 
 (0.1
43)** 
(0.1
02)** 
(0.2
35)** 
(0.2
48)* 
Observation
s 
589 589 254 254 
R-squared 0.48 0.40 0.23 0.27 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
    
* 
significant at 5% 
level; ** 
    
 52 
significant at 1% 
level 
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   Table (19) Regression Results for Egypt, Males, 1998 
Public Males   Private Males 
 lrhr
wg 
lrhr
wg 
lrhr
wg 
lrhr
wg 
exp 0.05
5 
0.05
6 
0.03
5 
0.04
2 
 (0.0
07)** 
(0.0
12)** 
(0.0
10)** 
(0.0
15)** 
exp2 -
0.050 
-
0.055 
-
0.045 
-
0.054 
 (0.0
13)** 
(0.0
22)* 
(0.0
17)** 
(0.0
24)* 
Urban(rural
=base) 
0.14
8 
0.12
8 
-
0.027 
-
0.016 
 (0.0
40)** 
(0.0
41)** 
(0.0
59) 
(0.0
62) 
Read&write 0.15
2 
0.40
7 
0.21
4 
0.13
3 
 (0.0
67)* 
(0.1
78)* 
(0.0
68)** 
(0.1
48) 
Primary 0.36
3 
0.68
4 
0.22
5 
0.29
1 
 (0.0
62)** 
(0.4
05) 
(0.0
64)** 
(0.4
04) 
Prep. 0.72
3 
0.90
4 
0.34
5 
0.49
1 
 (0.0
62)** 
(0.2
50)** 
(0.0
83)** 
(0.3
09) 
Secondary 0.89 0.79 0.42 0.80
 54 
6 3 6 1 
 (0.0
74)** 
(0.3
78)* 
(0.1
38)** 
(0.7
68) 
University 1.11
6 
1.10
2 
0.70
7 
0.72
2 
 (0.0
64)** 
(0.0
72)** 
(0.0
93)** 
(0.1
00)** 
lambdam -
0.080 
-
0.078 
-
0.158 
-
0.160 
 (0.0
37)* 
(0.0
37)* 
(0.0
51)** 
(0.0
52)** 
Primary*Exp  -
0.000 
 0.00
0 
  (0.0
00) 
 -
0.000 
Primary*Exp
2 
 -
0.011 
 (0.0
00) 
  (0.0
12) 
 (0.0
11) 
Prep*Exp  -
0.024 
 -
0.003 
  (0.0
27) 
 (0.0
30) 
Prep*Exp2  0.04
0 
 0.00
2 
  (0.0
44) 
 (0.0
51) 
Secon*Exp  -  -
 55 
0.024 0.008 
  (0.0
20) 
 (0.0
28) 
Secon*Exp2  0.05
8 
 0.00
2 
  (0.0
38) 
 (0.0
65) 
Univ*Exp  0.00
1 
 -
0.035 
  (0.0
33) 
 (0.0
74) 
Univ*Exp2  0.01
1 
 0.06
5 
  (0.0
67) 
 (0.1
45) 
Constant -
1.320 
-
1.281 
-
0.205 
-
0.318 
 (0.1
16)** 
(0.1
57)** 
(0.1
51) 
(0.2
24) 
Observation
s 
1307 1307 745 745 
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.13 0.13 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
    
* 
significant at 5% 
level; ** 
    
 56 
significant at 1% 
level 
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   Table (20) Regression Results, Egypt Females, 1998 
Public Females Private Females 
 lrh
rwg 
lrh
rwg 
lrh
rwg 
lrh
rwg 
exp 0.0
44 
0.0
55 
0.0
26 
-
0.003 
 (0.
009)** 
(0.
012)** 
(0.
034) 
(0.
041) 
exp2 -
0.012 
-
0.053 
-
0.012 
0.0
47 
 (0.
020) 
(0.
022)* 
(0.
067) 
(0.
079) 
Urban(rural
=base) 
0.0
19 
0.1
56 
0.2
61 
0.2
83 
 (0.
057) 
(0.
036)** 
(0.
401) 
(0.
411) 
Read&write 0.0
36 
0.4
17 
-
0.103 
-
0.876 
 (0.
251) 
(0.
179)* 
(0.
437) 
(1.
378) 
Primary 0.6
03 
0.7
24 
0.4
87 
-
0.469 
 (0.
197)** 
(0.
404) 
(0.
336) 
(1.
347) 
Prep. 0.9
40 
0.9
29 
0.6
15 
-
0.504 
 (0.
162)** 
(0.
250)** 
(0.
294)* 
(1.
001) 
Secondary 1.2 0.8 0.3 -
 58 
10 11 06 0.662 
 (0.
167)** 
(0.
378)* 
(0.
437) 
(2.
970) 
University 1.4
40 
1.1
21 
1.5
96 
1.5
43 
 (0.
165)** 
(0.
071)** 
(0.
287)** 
(0.
307)** 
lambdam -
0.160 
-
0.096 
-
0.048 
0.0
27 
 (0.
059)** 
(0.
052) 
(0.
694) 
(0.
714) 
Primary*Exp  -
0.000 
 0.0
01 
  -
0.011 
 (0.
001) 
Primary*Exp
2 
 (0.
000) 
 -
0.030 
  (0.
012) 
 (0.
136) 
Prep*Exp  -
0.025 
 0.1
24 
  (0.
027) 
 (0.
120) 
Prep*Exp2  0.0
42 
 -
0.290 
  (0.
044) 
 (0.
235) 
Secon*Exp  -  0.1
 59 
0.024 19 
  (0.
020) 
 (0.
102) 
Secon*Exp2  0.0
57 
 -
0.228 
  (0.
038) 
 (0.
213) 
Univ*Exp  0.0
02 
 0.0
86 
  (0.
033) 
 (0.
286) 
Univ*Exp2  0.0
09 
 -
0.157 
  (0.
067) 
 (0.
570) 
Constant -
1.443 
-
1.285 
-
0.944 
-
0.672 
 (0.
197)** 
(0.
158)** 
(0.
546) 
(0.
629) 
Observation
s 
636 636 78 78 
R-squared 0.4
2 
0.3
7 
0.4
0 
0.4
4 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
    
* 
significant at 5% 
    
 60 
level; ** 
significant at 1% 
level 
 
 61 
Table (21) Regression Results, Morocco, Males 1991 
Public Males    Private Males 
 lnhw
age_91 
lnhw
age_91 
lnhw
age_91 
lnhw
age_91 
exp 0.06
6 
0.12
3 
0.07
1 
0.03
8 
 (0.0
17)** 
(0.0
23)** 
(0.0
10)** 
(0.0
14)** 
exp2 -
0.090 
-
0.196 
-
0.103 
-
0.053 
 (0.0
30)** 
(0.0
37)** 
(0.0
18)** 
(0.0
24)* 
Urban(rural
=base) 
0.00
5 
-
0.070 
0.28
9 
0.30
3 
 (0.1
54) 
(0.1
51) 
(0.1
44)* 
(0.1
43)* 
Read&write 0.39
2 
2.87
2 
0.15
3 
-
0.113 
 (0.1
32)** 
(1.0
24)** 
(0.0
75)* 
(0.3
02) 
Primary 0.83
0 
2.34
1 
0.35
1 
-
0.833 
 (0.1
16)** 
(1.1
95) 
(0.0
98)** 
(0.3
54)* 
Prep. 1.15
9 
1.42
6 
0.60
6 
0.25
8 
 (0.1
24)** 
(0.7
52) 
(0.1
47)** 
(0.4
76) 
Secondary 1.44 4.20 1.27 -
 62 
0 3 9 0.241 
 (0.1
33)** 
(0.7
72)** 
(0.1
45)** 
(0.5
62) 
University 2.47
4 
2.44
4 
2.28
2 
2.16
3 
 (0.1
47)** 
(0.1
65)** 
(0.2
37)** 
(0.2
36)** 
lambdam -
0.310 
-
0.378 
0.13
8 
0.14
9 
 (0.1
16)** 
(0.1
13)** 
(0.1
41) 
(0.1
40) 
Primary*Exp  0.39
0 
 0.04
5 
  (0.1
08)** 
 (0.0
59) 
Primary*Exp
2 
 -
0.214 
 -
0.000 
  (0.0
69)** 
 (0.0
28) 
Prep*Exp  0.21
7 
 -
0.207 
  (0.1
31) 
 (0.0
81)* 
Prep*Exp2  -
0.123 
 0.10
8 
  (0.0
80) 
 (0.0
35)** 
Secon*Exp  0.11  0.09
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4 1 
  (0.1
05) 
 (0.1
11) 
Secon*Exp2  -
0.048 
 -
0.007 
  (0.0
56) 
 (0.0
49) 
Univ*Exp  0.50
6 
 -
0.212 
  (0.1
46)** 
 (0.1
93) 
Univ*Exp2  -
0.255 
 0.12
9 
  (0.0
69)** 
 (0.0
72) 
Constant -
3.125 
-
3.620 
-
3.786 
-
3.339 
 (0.2
79)** 
(0.3
81)** 
(0.2
62)** 
(0.2
86)** 
Observation
s 
376 376 660 660 
R-squared 0.57 0.60 0.28 0.31 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
    
* 
significant at 5% 
level; ** 
    
 64 
significant at 1% 
level 
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Table (22) Regression Results, Morocco, Females, 1991 
Public Females  Private Females 
 lnhw
age_91 
lnhw
age_91 
lnhw
age_91 
lnhw
age_91 
exp -
0.055 
0.11
3 
0.06
0 
0.05
3 
 (0.0
34) 
(0.0
20)** 
(0.0
18)** 
(0.0
20)** 
exp2 0.15
7 
-
0.180 
-
0.089 
-
0.077 
 (0.0
64)* 
(0.0
34)** 
(0.0
33)** 
(0.0
37)* 
Urban(rural
=base) 
0.37
1 
0.07
8 
0.02
2 
0.02
4 
 (0.5
14) 
(0.1
57) 
(0.1
42) 
(0.1
44) 
Read&write 1.33
9 
2.21
4 
0.51
8 
0.48
7 
 (0.3
75)** 
(0.6
41)** 
(0.1
83)** 
(0.6
56) 
Primary 1.72
0 
1.07
9 
0.78
2 
-
12.513 
 (0.3
32)** 
(0.6
86) 
(0.3
22)* 
(9.8
43) 
Prep. 2.08
5 
1.48
8 
1.47
8 
-
0.442 
 (0.3
40)** 
(0.6
13)* 
(0.2
38)** 
(1.6
88) 
Secondary 2.14 2.64 1.52 1.34
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1 1 5 4 
 (0.3
41)** 
(0.5
80)** 
(0.2
38)** 
(2.0
56) 
University 2.70
8 
2.47
0 
2.55
5 
2.54
5 
 (0.3
83)** 
(0.1
56)** 
(0.2
83)** 
(0.2
88)** 
lambdam -
2.431 
-
1.067 
-
0.082 
-
0.070 
 (1.7
03) 
(0.6
11) 
(0.1
76) 
(0.1
81) 
Primary*Exp  0.28
2 
 -
0.035 
  (0.0
76)** 
 (0.1
14) 
Primary*Exp
2 
 -
0.153 
 0.01
1 
  (0.0
45)** 
 (0.0
59) 
Prep*Exp  0.07
7 
 -
3.651 
  (0.0
85) 
 (2.7
54) 
Prep*Exp2  -
0.036 
 1.42
9 
  (0.0
48) 
 (1.0
65) 
Secon*Exp  0.08  -
 67 
7 0.319 
  (0.0
89) 
 (0.3
72) 
Secon*Exp2  -
0.039 
 0.16
4 
  (0.0
47) 
 (0.1
62) 
Univ*Exp  0.21
2 
 0.10
1 
  (0.1
16) 
 (0.6
72) 
Univ*Exp2  -
0.110 
 -
0.007 
  (0.0
53)* 
 (0.2
41) 
Constant -
3.137 
-
3.748 
-
3.631 
-
3.582 
 (0.7
13)** 
(0.3
51)** 
(0.3
37)** 
(0.3
50)** 
Observation
s 
109 109 154 154 
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.54 0.55 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
    
* 
significant at 5% 
level; ** 
    
 68 
significant at 1% 
level 
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   Table (23) Regression Results, Morocco, 1999 
Public Males   Private Males 
 lnhw
age_99 
lnhw
age_99 
lnhw
age_99 
lnhw
age_99 
exp 0.09
1 
0.12
5 
0.09
7 
0.07
1 
 (0.0
18)** 
(0.0
34)** 
(0.0
12)** 
(0.0
17)** 
exp2 -
0.130 
-
0.184 
-
0.144 
-
0.112 
 (0.0
28)** 
(0.0
49)** 
(0.0
20)** 
(0.0
28)** 
Urban(rural
=base) 
0.37
3 
0.38
0 
0.59
0 
0.52
8 
 (0.0
93)** 
(0.0
96)** 
(0.1
15)** 
(0.1
14)** 
Read&write 0.32
9 
0.13
8 
0.17
3 
-
0.148 
 (0.0
95)** 
(1.2
72) 
(0.0
74)* 
(0.3
99) 
Primary 0.47
5 
0.87
9 
0.19
8 
-
0.122 
 (0.0
87)** 
(0.9
10) 
(0.0
97)* 
(0.4
38) 
Prep. 0.77
5 
1.22
4 
0.55
2 
-
2.347 
 (0.0
81)** 
(0.9
24) 
(0.1
42)** 
(0.7
45)** 
Secondary 1.04 2.07 1.12 -
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4 6 8 0.047 
 (0.0
88)** 
(0.7
40)** 
(0.1
81)** 
(1.6
32) 
University 1.24
1 
1.21
1 
1.47
1 
1.41
6 
 (0.0
95)** 
(0.0
97)** 
(0.2
27)** 
(0.2
24)** 
lambdam -
0.023 
-
0.031 
-
0.159 
-
0.230 
 (0.0
45) 
(0.0
45) 
(0.0
96) 
(0.0
95)* 
Primary*Exp  0.00
1 
 0.01
7 
  0.01
1 
 (0.0
31) 
Primary*Exp
2 
 (0.0
80) 
 -
0.020 
  (0.1
21) 
 (0.0
57) 
Prep*Exp  -
0.035 
 -
0.005 
  (0.0
58) 
 (0.0
37) 
Prep*Exp2  0.06
4 
 0.04
9 
  (0.0
88) 
 (0.0
70) 
Secon*Exp  -  0.16
 71 
0.038 9 
  (0.0
59) 
 (0.0
61)** 
Secon*Exp2  0.07
0 
 -
0.192 
  (0.0
91) 
 (0.1
15) 
Univ*Exp  -
0.067 
 0.06
7 
  (0.0
51) 
 (0.1
18) 
Univ*Exp2  0.09
5 
 -
0.084 
  (0.0
85) 
 (0.2
07) 
Constant 0.32
4 
-
0.147 
-
0.156 
0.43
9 
 (0.3
03) 
(0.5
44) 
(0.2
44) 
(0.3
24) 
Observation
s 
434 434 1055 1055 
R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.28 0.31 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
    
* 
significant at 5% 
level; ** 
    
 72 
significant at 1% 
level 
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   Table (24) Regression Result, Morocco, Females 1999 
    Public Females Private Females 
 lnhw
age_99 
lnhw
age_99 
lnhw
age_99 
lnhw
age_99 
exp -
0.007 
0.12
5 
0.05
4 
0.04
3 
 (0.0
36) 
(0.0
33)** 
(0.0
17)** 
(0.0
18)* 
exp2 0.04
4 
-
0.185 
-
0.082 
-
0.067 
 (0.0
61) 
(0.0
49)** 
(0.0
34)* 
(0.0
37) 
Urban(rural
=base) 
-
0.218 
0.69
5 
1.15
7 
1.14
7 
 (0.4
33) 
(0.2
32)** 
(0.2
87)** 
(0.2
88)** 
Read&write 0.09
7 
0.17
7 
0.23
9 
-
0.198 
 (0.2
17) 
(1.2
69) 
(0.1
48) 
(0.5
22) 
Primary 0.64
1 
0.96
1 
0.54
2 
0.60
2 
 (0.1
96)** 
(0.9
11) 
(0.1
75)** 
(0.9
31) 
Prep. 1.04
7 
1.22
8 
1.13
9 
-
1.749 
 (0.1
41)** 
(0.9
20) 
(0.2
14)** 
(1.3
09) 
Secondary 1.19 2.03 1.53 5.19
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0 1 3 3 
 (0.1
61)** 
(0.7
36)** 
(0.3
21)** 
(4.2
77) 
University 1.71
5 
1.23
1 
1.55
6 
1.57
2 
 (0.1
61)** 
(0.0
93)** 
(0.3
86)** 
(0.3
83)** 
lambdam -
0.006 
0.16
7 
0.08
1 
0.08
1 
 (0.2
25) 
(0.1
22) 
(0.1
89) 
(0.1
90) 
Primary*Exp  0.00
0 
 0.06
5 
  0.01
2 
 (0.0
56) 
Primary*Exp
2 
 (0.0
80) 
 -
0.170 
  (0.1
20) 
 (0.1
28) 
Prep*Exp  -
0.040 
 -
0.043 
  (0.0
58) 
 (0.0
94) 
Prep*Exp2  0.07
1 
 0.16
0 
  (0.0
88) 
 (0.2
04) 
Secon*Exp  -  0.22
 75 
0.038 5 
  (0.0
59) 
 (0.1
27) 
Secon*Exp2  0.07
0 
 -
0.354 
  (0.0
91) 
 (0.2
81) 
Univ*Exp  -
0.064 
 -
0.356 
  (0.0
50) 
 (0.3
67) 
Univ*Exp2  0.09
1 
 0.79
3 
  (0.0
85) 
 (0.7
38) 
Constant 1.65
8 
-
0.580 
-
0.966 
-
0.821 
 (0.7
18)* 
(0.6
10) 
(0.4
81)* 
(0.4
91) 
Observation
s 
147 147 379 379 
R-squared 0.55 0.47 0.32 0.35 
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses 
    
* 
significant at 5% 
level; ** 
    
 76 
significant at 1% 
level 
 
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocco. 
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Table (25): % Differences in Private Rates of Return By Sector of Employment, Egypt, 1988 and 1998 
Males       
Education Level Public, 88 Public, 98 Private, 88* Private, 98   
Primary to R&W 5.27 7.03 1.20 0.37   
Prep. To Primary 13.83 12.00 6.40 4.00   
Sec. to Prep. 4.93 5.77 -1.57 2.70   
Univ. to Sec. 6.93 5.50 10.93 7.03   
       
       
Females,       
Education Level Public, 88 Public, 98 Private, 88* Private, 98*   
Primary to R&W 9.53 18.90 5.90 12.80   
Prep. To Primary 17.10 11.23 2.73 4.27   
Sec. to Prep. 4.97 9.00 -7.53 -10.30   
Univ. to Sec. 7.13 5.75 28.68 32.25   
       
* Corresponds to insignificant coefficients.    
Shaded areas correspond to insignificant coefficients.   
Source: Authors' own calculations from LFSS 1988 and ELMS 1998.  
       
 
 
Table (26): % Differences in Private Rates of Return By Sector of Employment, Morocco 
1991 and 1999 
Males      
Education Level Public, 91 Public, 99 Private, 91* Private, 99  
Primary to R&W 14.60 4.87 6.60 0.83  
Prep. To Primary 10.97 10.00 8.50 11.80  
Sec. to Prep. 9.37 8.97 22.43 19.20  
Univ. to Sec. 25.85 4.93 25.08 8.58  
      
      
Females,      
Education Level Public, 91 Public, 99 Private, 91* Private, 99*  
Primary to R&W 12.70 18.13 8.80 10.10  
Prep. To Primary 12.17 13.53 23.20 19.90  
Sec. to Prep. 1.87 4.77 1.57 13.13  
Univ. to Sec. 14.18 13.13 25.75 0.58  
      
* Corresponds to insignificant coefficients.   
Shaded areas correspond to insignificant coefficients.   
Source: Authors' own calculations from1991 and 1999 MLSMS, Morocco. 
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Differences in Private Rates of  Returns to Education, By Sector of Employment, Males, 
Egypt
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Differences in Private Rates of Returns to Education, By Sector of 
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% Difference in Wages Unexplained (i.e. Due to Discrimination), Egypt
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Key for Graphs 
M= Male 
F=Female 
P=Public 
V=Private 
E=Egypt 
MC=Morocco 
A=1988 for Egypt, and 1991 for Morocco  
B=1998 for Egypt, and 1999 for Morocco 
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Table (27):Wage Decomposition for Egypt and Morocco: Public vs. Private; Males vs. 
Females   
 
  Raw Diff. %Explained %Unexplained Adjusted  
  in logs Endowments Discrimination  Gap (%) 
Egypt         
Males, Public-Private Wage Differentials (1998) 0.06 52 48 3 
Females, Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(1998) 0.20 20 80 16 
Public (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1998) 0.04 19 81 3 
Private (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1998) 0.17 30 70 12 
Males, Public-Private Wage Differentials (1988) 0.15 55 44 7 
Females, Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(1988) 0.52 67 33 17 
Public (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1988) 0.09 14 86 8 
Private (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1988) 0.46 15 85 39 
 Morocco         
Males, Public-Private Wage Differentials (1999) 1.13 49 51 58 
Females, Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(1999) 1.62 50 50 81 
Public (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1999) 0.08 27 73 6 
Private (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1999) 0.58 28 72 42 
Males, Public-Private Wage Differentials (1991) 1.10 70 30 33 
Females, Public-Private Wage Differentials 
(1991) 1.29 89 11 14 
Public (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1991) 0.05 30 70 3 
Private (Males-Females) Wage Differentials 
(1991) 0.24 18 82 20 
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Table (A-1)Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis  
       
1- Public Sector Males, 1998, Egypt  2- Public Sector Females, 1998, Egypt 
No. of Observations= 1307   No. of Observations= 636  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 0.369 0.646   Log Real Wage 0.356 0.656 
Urban 0.706 0.456   Urban 0.848 0.360 
Experience 23.550 11.423   Experience 18.349 9.805 
Experience Sq. 6.850 5.649   Experience Sq. 4.327 4.021 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000   Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.090 0.286   Read&Write 0.007 0.086 
Primary 0.151 0.358   Primary 0.029 0.169 
Preparatory 0.291 0.454   Preparatory 0.397 0.490 
Secondary 0.105 0.307   Secondary 0.177 0.382 
University+ 0.287 0.452   University+ 0.370 0.483 
M. Illiterate 0.208 0.406   M. Illiterate 0.363 0.481 
F. Read&Write 0.388 0.487   F. Read&Write 0.407 0.492 
F.Primary 0.037 0.188   F.Primary 0.063 0.244 
F. Secondary 0.020 0.139   F. Secondary 0.027 0.163 
F. University 0.045 0.208   F. University 0.095 0.293 
Sibling 0-6 Years 0.819 1.033   Sibling 0-6 Years 0.585 0.844 
Sibling >6 Years 3.826 2.313   Sibling >6 Years 3.173 1.795 
        
        
3- Private Sector Males, 1998, Egypt   4- Private Sector Females, 1998, Egypt 
No. of Observations= 745    No. of Observations= 78  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 0.223 0.646   Log Real Wage -0.048 0.902 
Urban 0.631 0.483   Urban 0.775 0.419 
Experience 16.958 12.146   Experience 12.030 11.326 
Experience Sq. 4.350 5.511   Experience Sq. 2.724 4.446 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000   Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.122 0.328   Read&Write 0.044 0.206 
Primary 0.249 0.433   Primary 0.113 0.317 
Preparatory 0.240 0.427   Preparatory 0.289 0.455 
Secondary 0.036 0.186   Secondary 0.074 0.262 
University+ 0.086 0.280   University+ 0.235 0.425 
M. Illiterate 0.156 0.363   M. Illiterate 0.301 0.462 
F. Read&Write 0.300 0.458   F. Read&Write 0.309 0.464 
F.Primary 0.024 0.153   F.Primary 0.018 0.134 
F. Secondary 0.006 0.080   F. Secondary 0.018 0.134 
F. University 0.025 0.156   F. University 0.064 0.245 
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Sibling 0-6 Years 0.821 1.077   Sibling 0-6 Years 0.642 0.907 
Sibling >6 Years 4.349 2.497   Sibling >6 Years 3.995 2.180 
        
        
5- Public Sector Males, 1988, Egypt   6- Public Sector Females, 1988, Egypt 
No. of Observations= 1689    No. of Observations= 589  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 0.628 0.658   Log Real Wage 0.536 0.657 
Urban 0.677 0.468   Urban 0.845 0.362 
Experience 23.011 12.008   Experience 13.697 8.906 
Experience Sq. 6.736 6.156   Experience Sq. 2.668 3.381 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000   Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.187 0.390   Read&Write 0.013 0.115 
Primary 0.125 0.331   Primary 0.039 0.193 
Preparatory 0.244 0.430   Preparatory 0.466 0.499 
Secondary 0.066 0.248   Secondary 0.148 0.356 
University+ 0.232 0.422   University+ 0.291 0.455 
M. Illiterate 0.150 0.357   M. Illiterate 0.367 0.482 
F. Read&Write 0.348 0.477   F. Read&Write 0.438 0.497 
F.Primary 0.070 0.256   F.Primary 0.094 0.293 
F. Secondary 0.009 0.093   F. Secondary 0.025 0.157 
F. University 0.039 0.193   F. University 0.084 0.278 
Sibling 0-6 Years 1.121 1.326   Sibling 0-6 Years 0.774 1.034 
Sibling >6 Years 4.028 2.642   Sibling >6 Years 3.258 2.098 
        
        
7- Private Sector Males, 1988, Egypt   8- Private Sector Females, 1988, Egypt 
No. of Observations= 1595    No. of Observations= 254  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 0.484 0.703   Log Real Wage 0.044 0.779 
Urban 0.590 0.492   Urban 0.627 0.484 
Experience 15.379 12.516   Experience 13.220 11.235 
Experience Sq. 3.931 5.675   Experience Sq. 3.005 4.741 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000   Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.167 0.373   Read&Write 0.043 0.203 
Primary 0.207 0.405   Primary 0.097 0.296 
Preparatory 0.149 0.357   Preparatory 0.233 0.423 
Secondary 0.021 0.143   Secondary 0.032 0.177 
University+ 0.055 0.228   University+ 0.118 0.324 
M. Illiterate 0.117 0.321   M. Illiterate 0.204 0.404 
F. Read&Write 0.262 0.440   F. Read&Write 0.216 0.412 
F.Primary 0.052 0.222   F.Primary 0.098 0.298 
F. Secondary 0.006 0.075   F. Secondary 0.008 0.088 
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F. University 0.020 0.140   F. University 0.063 0.243 
Sibling 0-6 Years 1.145 1.420   Sibling 0-6 Years 0.832 1.068 
Sibling >6 Years 4.549 2.791   Sibling >6 Years 3.910 2.235 
        
        
9- Public Sector Males, 1999, Morocco   10- Public Sector Females, 1999, M orocco 
No. of Observations= 434    No. of Observations= 147  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 2.640 0.695   Log Real Wage 2.553 0.703 
Experience 28.597 9.188   Experience 26.800 7.754 
Experience Sq. 9.020 5.495   Experience Sq. 7.781 4.386 
Urban 0.894 0.308   Urban 0.990 0.099 
Illiterate 0.296 0.457   Illiterate 0.185 0.390 
Read&Write 0.125 0.331   Read&Write 0.059 0.235 
Primary 0.174 0.380   Primary 0.073 0.261 
Preparatory 0.223 0.416   Preparatory 0.322 0.468 
Secondary 0.165 0.372   Secondary 0.210 0.408 
University+ 0.142 0.349   University+ 0.210 0.408 
M. Illiterate 0.031 0.173   M. Illiterate 0.105 0.308 
F. Read&Write 0.679 0.467   F. Read&Write 0.512 0.501 
F.Primary 0.220 0.415   F.Primary 0.227 0.420 
F. Preparatory 0.067 0.251   F. Preparatory 0.151 0.359 
F. Secondary 0.016 0.125   F. Secondary 0.070 0.255 
F. University 0.012 0.109   F. University 0.023 0.151 
Sibling 0-6 Years 0.891 1.042   Sibling 0-6 Years 0.634 0.856 
Sibling >6 Years 5.245 2.483   Sibling >6 Years 5.068 2.293 
        
        
11- Private Sector Males, 1999, Morocco   12- Private Sector Females, 1999, Morocco 
No. of Observations= 1055    No. of Observations= 379  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage 1.354 1.079   Log Real Wage 1.050 1.111 
Experience 20.364 11.783   Experience 18.022 10.890 
Experience Sq. 5.535 5.807   Experience Sq. 4.432 5.007 
Urban 0.608 0.488   Urban 0.827 0.379 
Illiterate 0.713 0.452   Illiterate 0.699 0.459 
Read&Write 0.304 0.460   Read&Write 0.217 0.412 
Primary 0.184 0.388   Primary 0.158 0.365 
Preparatory 0.063 0.242   Preparatory 0.092 0.289 
Secondary 0.026 0.159   Secondary 0.031 0.172 
University+ 0.014 0.118   University+ 0.020 0.141 
M. Illiterate 0.021 0.144   M. Illiterate 0.029 0.169 
F. Read&Write 0.778 0.416   F. Read&Write 0.754 0.431 
F.Primary 0.130 0.337   F.Primary 0.125 0.331 
 85 
F. Preparatory 0.057 0.231   F. Preparatory 0.077 0.267 
F. Secondary 0.014 0.116   F. Secondary 0.008 0.089 
F. University 0.010 0.097   F. University 0.012 0.109 
Sibling 0-6 Years 0.890 1.033   Sibling 0-6 Years 0.629 0.927 
Sibling >6 Years 6.088 2.602   Sibling >6 Years 5.736 2.546 
        
        
13- Public Sector Males, 1991, Morocco   14- Public Sector Females, 1991, Morocco 
No. of Observations= 376    No. of Observations= 109  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage -1.243 1.011   Log Real Wage -1.374 1.017 
Urban 0.854 0.353   Urban 0.942 0.235 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000   Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.139 0.346   Read&Write 0.051 0.220 
Primary 0.184 0.388   Primary 0.145 0.353 
Preparatory 0.177 0.382   Preparatory 0.203 0.404 
Secondary 0.168 0.374   Secondary 0.312 0.465 
University+ 0.146 0.353   University+ 0.145 0.353 
M. Illiterate 0.005 0.070   M. Illiterate 0.031 0.174 
F. Read&Write 0.821 0.384   F. Read&Write 0.780 0.416 
F.Primary 0.150 0.358   F.Primary 0.119 0.326 
F. Preparatory 0.018 0.132   F. Preparatory 0.064 0.246 
F. Secondary 0.002 0.047   F. Secondary 0.018 0.135 
F. University 0.004 0.066   F. University 0.018 0.135 
        
        
15- Private Sector Males, 1991, Morocco   16- Private Sector Females, 1991, Morocco 
No. of Observations= 660    No. of Observations= 154  
Variable Mean Std. Dev.   Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log Real Wage -2.412 0.836   Log Real Wage -2.684 0.950 
Urban 0.486 0.500   Urban 0.728 0.446 
Illiterate 0.000 0.000   Illiterate 0.000 0.000 
Read&Write 0.271 0.445   Read&Write 0.168 0.374 
Primary 0.132 0.339   Primary 0.052 0.223 
Preparatory 0.046 0.210   Preparatory 0.071 0.257 
Secondary 0.037 0.188   Secondary 0.056 0.230 
University+ 0.011 0.105   University+ 0.026 0.160 
M. Illiterate 0.013 0.114   M. Illiterate 0.021 0.143 
F. Read&Write 0.838 0.369   F. Read&Write 0.799 0.402 
F.Primary 0.112 0.316   F.Primary 0.143 0.351 
F. Preparatory 0.033 0.180   F. Preparatory 0.032 0.178 
F. Secondary 0.009 0.095   F. Secondary 0.026 0.160 
F. University 0.005 0.067   F. University 0.000 0.000 
        
 
